In many organisations there is a sharp divide between the ‘doers’ who deliver the final product and those who support them. Nowhere is this division as stark as in the Army. We have it cemented in the lexicon – every soldier either belongs to a combat arm or a support arm. Needless to say it is the combat arms that are first among equals. They provide the majority of the Army’s senior generals and they almost exclusively occupy the key decision making posts on the path to senior leadership.

The Royal Corps of Signals are traditionally anchored in this supporting role. As a corps we are seen (and indeed we see ourselves) as a cohort of communications specialists who enable everything the Army does; never have communications been as critical as they are now on the modern battlefield. Despite this vital role we are like stage lighting – when it goes well we go unnoticed but when it goes wrong the pointed ‘wrong crystals’ jibes come thick and fast. By being comfortable in this ‘supporting actor role’ we are selling ourselves short and adopting a position from which it is difficult to exert influence. 

The reality is that Royal Signals are already well established as agents of combat effect. The Corps has long been the Army’s proponent of Electronic Warfare providing offensive capability in the electronic spectrum. More recently Royal Signals personnel have been at the vanguard of developing cyber capability tactically in the Land Environment and at the operational and strategic level in the Joint battlespace. The importance of these contributions to full spectrum targeting is both growing at pace and quickly increasing in relevance. Cyber operations provide the targeteer with options throughout the spectrum of conflict including when kinetic strikes are not militarily or politically viable. Likewise, EW and cyber effects are a potent force multiplier when woven and synchronised with other effects.

As this fundamental evolution of warfare unfolds before us it is imperative that the Royal Signals moves quickly to ensure its ambition and influence match an increasing contribution to effects delivery. A cultural change is required; the Corps must see itself differently by thinking in a J3 (Operations) way alongside the more traditional J6 (Communications) mindset.

The Royal Signals must be better at training our people to be war fighters and we must work to place our best people in crunchy planning, operations and targeting jobs at all levels. Concurrently, of course, an influence campaign will be required with the old guard of traditional Army leadership who will understandably be wary of a newcomer to the party.

There are elements of the Royal Signals that effectively perform the function of a combat arm now. Let’s have a moment to let that sink in, then pull up our socks and take our rightful place at the table.